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Occupational Health Risks and the
Worker's Right to Know
The cost of a thing is the amount of what I will call
life which is required to be exchanged for it, immediately
or in the long run.
Henry David Thoreau, Walden
Occupational disease' is a major national health problem;2 an estimated
390,000 new cases of occupational illness and 100,000 work-related
deaths occur each year.' Occupational exposure to carcinogens may be a
factor in more than twenty percent of all cancer cases in the United
States.' The health hazards posed by occupational disease are largely hid-
den from the workers whose health is at risk, and current Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)' regulations fall far short of
1. An occupational disease is one that results from conditions of employment. Classic examples
include respiratory diseases such as asbestosis, which results from inhalation of asbestos fibers, and the
liver cancer angiosarcoma, which results from exposure to vinyl chloride.
2. See N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY 92-96
(1976) (available statistics seriously underestimate enormity of America's health problem and attend-
ant social costs of hazardous working conditions); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 11-53 (1980) (assessment of magnitude and severity of occu-
pational disease problem). A report issued by a panel of the Center for Disease Control concluded:
"Our knowledge of disease and death caused by substances in the workplace, while very incomplete, is
sufficient to suggest that we are on the threshold of 'an epidemic' of occupationally related disease."
CDC Advisory Group Lists Hazards in Workplace as Top Priority Problem, [ 1978] OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORTER (BNA) 540 [reporter hereinafter cited as O.S.H. REP.].
3. Report on Occupational Safety and Health by the US. Dep't of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, in THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 111 (1972). These esti-
mates are probably conservative. See, e.g., D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB 44-46 (1978) (estimate in
The President's Report on Occupational Safety and Health, supra, probably far below true incidence
rate, given low recognition and compensation of occupational disease); Note, Compensating Victims of
Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 916 n.2 (1980) (finding estimates conservative based on
other occupational disease and mortality statistics).
4. TOXIC SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMMITTEE, TOXIC CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION 120
(1980). The importance of occupational exposure as a cause of cancer is a subject of continuing de-
bate. See, e.g., Number of Job-Induced Cancers Over-Rated, NYU Professor Tells SOCMA, [1979]
O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 454 (address by Harry B. Demopoulos at meeting of Synthetic and Organic
Chemical Manufacturers Association); Occupational Carcinogens Described as Significant Factor in
Cancer Deaths, [1980] O.S.H. REP. 560 (comments of Joel B. Swartz, University of Illinois Medical
Center); One-Tenth of U.S. Cancer Deaths in Coming Years Related to Asbestos, [1978] O.S.H. REP.
(BNA) 32 (testimony of Irving J. Selikoff, director of Environmental Sciences at Mount Sinai School
of Medicine); Smoking, Not Occupation Responsible for Many Cancer Cases, Conference Told,
[1980] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) (opinion of Sir Richard Doll, professor of medicine at Oxford).
5. OSHA, a division of the Department of Labor, has primary responsibility for carrying out the




requiring adequate disclosure to employees of discoverable health risks.'
The health risks of employment should be discovered and disclosed to
workers for at least three important reasons: to respect the autonomy of
individuals in making basic life decisions, to legitimate the distribution of
risk, and to enhance the efficiency of efforts to reduce risk. This Note
argues that the common law provides a firm basis for requiring employers
to disclose to employees the hidden health risks of employment. In order
to standardize the assessment and disclosure of occupational health risks,
the Note proposes the enactment of federal legislation modeled after con-
sumer protection disclosure laws.
I. Occupational Health Risks
The chronic nature of most of the diseases that result from exposure to
toxic substances7 makes occupational health hazards difficult to identify
and assess. The effects of exposure to toxic substances typically surface
several years or more after initial exposure, particularly in the case of
carcinogens.' Even a very brief period of exposure to some substances,
such as asbestos, may increase significantly the risk of serious disease later
in life.' Most of the more than 200,000 chemicals used currently in work-
places"0 are known to employees only by trade names, and even employers
often do not know the chemical compositions" of the many hazardous
substances used in their plants.'
2
6. See pp. 1795-98 infra.
7. For purposes of this Note, a toxic substance is defined as any substance that has a demonstrated
potential for impairing health. For a more technical definition of toxicity in the context of workplace
exposure, see 46 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4416 (1981) (proposed rule for identification of workplace hazards).
8. Control of Toxic Substances in the Workplace: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Gov't Operations House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (statement of Dr. Thomas
F. Mancuso, research professor of occupational health, University of Pittsburgh) [hereinafter cited as
Toxic Substances Hearings]. See W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 69 (1976) (table of latency
periods in man for some known carcinogens).
9. See Short-Exposure Risk Indicated in Study of New Jersey Workers, Researcher Says, [1978]
O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 102 (report of Herbert Seidman, representative of American Cancer Society).
10. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has a file of more than
200,000 chemical products. Toxic Substances Hearings, supra note 8, at 46 (testimony of Dr. John F.
Finklea, then director of NIOSH). About 1,000 new chemicals are introduced into the workplace each
year. 46 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4415 (1981).
NIOSH was created by § 22 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 671
(1976). It is a part of the Department of Health and Human Services and conducts research and
education programs relating to occupational safety and health.
11. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE RIGHT TO KNOW 7
(1977) (over 70% of chemical exposures recorded in health hazards survey attributable to trade name
products with chemical compositions unknown to company).
12. Thousands of known toxic substances currently are used commercially, and usually workers
are exposed to mixtures of chemicals that may lead to multiple causation of disease or synergistic
effects. N. ASHFORD, supra note 2, at 15.
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A. Effects of Insufficient Information
As a result of poor information regarding the health risks of employ-
ment, only a small percentage of the victims of occupational disease re-
ceive any compensation for their injuries." The extended period of time
between exposure to hazardous substances and the onset of disability or
death, combined with the fact that many occupation-related diseases have
multiple causes, makes it difficult to establish the requisite causation for
compensation.14 Furthermore, because of their ignorance of workplace
health hazards, many workers may not recognize occupation-related dis-
eases as such and may not file claims for workers' compensation."
Because of this information deficiency and the limits of current state
workers' compensation laws, even workers who receive some compensa-
tion for occupation-related diseases are not compensated fully. 6 Most such
workers receive only about one-eighth of their lost wages, 7 largely be-
cause the medical and legal complexities involved in establishing the req-
uisite causation lead to compromised claims and high legal and adminis-
trative costs.'" Furthermore, even the maximum recovery possible under
workers' compensation laws does not include payments for pain and suf-
fering or for other intangible costs of illness or shortened life. 9
The costs of occupational disease, then, rest largely on employees.
Much of the cost that is not borne by employees and their families is paid
13. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2, at 3 (only five percent of employees severely disabled by
occupational disease receive workers' compensation).
14. Id. For a thorough discussion of causation problems and other difficulties in obtaining benefits
for occupational disease disability under current state workers' compensation laws, see N. ASHFORD,
supra note 2, at 411-16; Note, supra note 3, at 920-29.
15. See D. BERMAN, supra note 3, at 68-69. In a two-year pilot project sponsored by NIOSH,
workers in 136 small plants in Oregon and Washington were examined for symptoms of work-related
disease. The project data showed that nearly 90% of the work-related medical conditions discovered
had not resulted in claims for workers' compensation. Toxic Substances Hearings, supra note 8, at 39-
40 (testimony of Dr. John Finkla, then director of NIOSH).
Further, though some occupational diseases result only from exposure to a specific substance, many
occupational diseases create clinical symptoms indistinguishable from the "ordinary diseases of life."
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2, at 68.
16. To address this problem, a bill introduced in Congress in 1979, Congressional Record, H.R.
5482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H8786 (1979), would have set a minimum federal
standard for workers' compensation awards and procedures. See Measure to Set Federal Standards
Would Be Inflationary, House Panel Told, [1980] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 999. A Senate bill introduced
in 1980, Congressional Record, S. 2847, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S7286 (1980), would
have set minimum standards for compensation of asbestos-related disabilities. Senate Bill Would Set
Minimum Standards for Asbestos-Related Compensation Awards, [1980] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 96.
17. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2, at 4. But see D. BERMAN, supra note 3, at 62 (those
receiving compensation recover average of slightly more than 20% of income losses from job-related
disability).
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2, at 3-4 (due to medical and legal complexities, 60% of
occupational disease compensation awards initially were denied and over 50% of occupational disease
compensation awards ended in compromise and release agreements involving small lump settlements).
19. See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.20 (1976).
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by the public in the form of social welfare health benefits. 20 Employers
bear only a small part of the financial burden of occupational health risks,
and therefore have insufficient incentive to improve job health. Employers
typically will attempt to prevent occupational health hazards only if pre-
vention costs less than their direct costs from occupational illness. Because
employers' direct costs, consisting principally of workers' compensation
premiums, reflect only a small proportion of the true costs of occupational
disease, employer expenditures for prevention are correspondingly low. 21
The lack of information about workplace hazards also impedes efforts
to reduce health risks through collective bargaining. Some labor unions,
notably'the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, the United Auto Work-
ers, and the United Steel Workers, have bargained successfully for in-
creased information about health risks.22 The bargaining energy and re-
sources required to obtain information about risks, however, detract from
the ability of unions to bargain for the actual reduction of risks. Better
information is essential to any attempt to reduce the insidious risks of
occupational disease.23
B. Current Approaches to the Information Problem
Federal regulation of workplace health has relied on standards for spe-
cific substances and has failed to address adequately the general informa-
tion problem. Recent state legislative efforts to fill the information gap,
though significant, are inherently limited.
1. OSHA
Federal efforts to reduce health risks from exposure to toxic substances
in the workplace have focused on setting maximum exposure standards for
specific substances under section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act.2 In addition, section 6(b)(7) of the Act mandates warnings to
20. Id. at 4 (occupational disease costs the social security and welfare systems about $2.2 billion
annually).
21. See N. ASHFORD, supra note 2, at 346-53 (most serious obstacle to improvement in workplace
health and safety is failure to hold employers financially accountable for consequences of hazardous
working conditions).
22. See N. ASHFORD, supra note 2, at 492-95; L. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND
HEALTH 61-76 (1980); D. BERMAN, supra note 3, at 120-30. Access to such information has also been
won through litigation under the National Labor Relations Act. See pp. 1805-06 infra.
23. According to Anthony Robbins, Director of NIOSH: "Perhaps the greatest problem facing
occupational health practitioners is the 'ignorance of employers and workers about exposures to toxic
substances . . . . The most rapid way to bring about change in occupational medicine would be to
inform workers.'" "Ignorance" About Exposures Seen Greatest Occupational Health Problem, [1979]
O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 517 (address to American Medical Association Congress on Occupational
Health).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976). Section 6(b)(5) provides:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical
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employees about the hazards of substances for which an exposure stan-
dard has been set.25 Under this warning provision, some OSHA standards
require signs on the entrances to areas in which the regulated substance is
used and labels on containers holding the regulated substance. The re-
quired warnings and labels are of a general cautionary nature, however,
and do not define specifically the dangers posed.26
OSHA's warning requirements are inadequate even for the few sub-
stances presently regulated. The requirements fail to mandate assess-
ment of exposures and health risks on a job-position basis and do not
require warnings to individuals offered hazardous jobs. Furthermore,
OSHA has set standards for only a small share of the large number of
workplace substances known to have serious health effects, 2' and it has
agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer mate-
rial impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life.
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1976).
26. For example, containers of the carcinogen vinyl chloride are required to bear the label: "POL-
YVINYL CHLORIDE (OR TRADE NAME) / Contains / VINYL CHLORIDE / VINYL CHLORIDE IS A CAN-
CER-SUSPECT AGENT." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(1)(4) (1980). Similarly, entrances to areas in which
asbestos fibers may exceed exposure limits must be posted with a sign that bears the statement: "CAU-
TION / Contains Asbestos Fibers /Avoid Creating Dust /Breathing Asbestos Dust May Cause Serious
Bodily Harm." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(g)(2) (1980).
Some regulations setting maximum exposure limits for a substance also require employers to notify
employees known to have been exposed to concentrations in excess of the exposure limit. See, e.g., 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1001(i)(3) (1980) (notification requirements with respect to asbestos, promulgated in
1974). Other regulations require training for employees who will come into contact with the regulated
substance. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(j) (1980) (training requirements for handling vinyl chlo-
ride, promulgated in 1974).
27. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 11, at 5
(finding workers unaware of wide variety of potentially harmful chemical agents to which they are
exposed). A survey of occupational hazards conducted by NIOSH in 1976 found minimal workplace
recognition of OSHA regulated substances. In the 5,200 plants surveyed, workers were exposed to
95,000 different trade name products. The actual chemical composition of 90% of those products was
unknown at the plants where they were used. Of the 40,592 trade-name products that NIOSH subse-
quently identified, 17,987 or approximately 45% contained chemicals regulated by OSHA. Toxic Sub-
stances Hearings, supra note 87, at 55-56 (letter of Dr. John F. Finklea, director of NIOSH).
28. The Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, a document prepared and updated by
NIOSH pursuant to § 2 0(a)(6) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(6)
(1976), listed 33,929 toxic substances in 1978; about 1,500 new toxic substances are added to the
Registry each quarter. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,212, 35,258 (1980) (to be codified in revised 29 C.F.R. §
1910.20). A sub-file of suspected carcinogens lists nearly 2,000 substances. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 11, at 9.
OSHA has converted pre-OSHA advisory health standards for approximately 400 toxic substances
into legally enforceable exposure limits. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2, at 111; see 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1000 (1980) (regulation of air contaminants). Since the passage of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act in 1970, NIOSH has supplied OSHA with "criteria documents," recommending further
regulation of some 90 substances or categories of substances. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,212, 35,258 (1980).
Such criteria documents are authorized by § 22(c)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 671(c)(1) (1976). Yet
OSHA has issued only 11 new health standards covering 23 substances. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra
note 2, at 111.
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inadequate resources to enforce even those standards effectively. 9 Current
procedures and resources will permit regulation of only a very small per-
centage of toxic workplace chemicals in the foreseeable future."
Recently, OSHA has undertaken information initiatives apart from the
standard-setting process. A recently enacted rule grants employees and
their representatives access to employer records of employee exposure to
toxic substances and employee medical data.31 The preamble to the OSHA
access rule expresses the importance of the employee's "right to know,"32
but the rule falls short of establishing that right. The rule does not man-
date the keeping of any records; it only creates rights of access to existing
records and requires their preservation.3 Yet only a small minority of
employers monitor employee exposure to toxic substances, 4 and regular
monitoring generally is not required even for substances subject to official
OSHA exposure standards.3 1 Moreover, the rule will actually deter em-
ployers from maintaining exposure records that are not required; by pro-
29. Although approximately 25 million workers, one-fourth of the United States labor force, may
be exposed to OSHA-regulated health hazards, only 500,000 workers are employed in worksites in-
spected by OSHA in a given year. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2, at 112-14. OSHA has ap-
proximately 1,500 inspectors to enforce all OSHA workplace requirements. 46 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4432
(1981). Further, the present level of OSHA enforcement does not create any financial incentive for
compliance with OSHA standards. See Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regu-
lation, 10 BELL J. OF ECON. 117 (1979). There is no private right of action to enforce the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act or regulations made pursuant to it. See Russel v. Bartley, 439 F.2d 334
(6th Cir. 1974) (Occupational Safety and Health Act does not create private right of action against
employers found guilty of violating Act); Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 438 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973)
(same); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (D. Pa. 1978) (same).
30. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,212, 35,258 (1980). The standard-setting process is long and costly. See U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2, at 112. It involves an initial NIOSH criteria document recommending
regulation of a substance, advance notice of proposed rulemaking, public comment and hearings, pub-
lication of a proposed rule, further public comment and hearings, and promulgation of a final rule
subject to judicial review. The procedures for standard setting are prescribed by § 6(b) of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976). Judicial review is specifically provided for
in § 6(f), 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). All but two of the health standards issued by OSHA have been
challenged in the courts, and thus enforcement has usually been stayed or limited pending final court
decisions. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2, at 112. OSHA officials have estimated that in the
future it will take three and one-half to four years to issue a major standard after receiving a criteria
document. NIOSH Eyes Increase in Field Efforts by Shifting Positions, NAGOSH is Told, [1979]
O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 380; cf. Slowdown in Rate of OSHA Standards Seen Result of Supreme Court
Ruling, [1980] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 263 (predicting Supreme Court decision on benzene standard will
slow issuance of regulations).
31. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,212 (1980).
32. "Workers must, in all cases, at least have a right to know exactly what they are exposed to on
the job, what is the magnitude of this exposure, and what are the resulting adverse health effects." Id.
at 35,239.
33. Id. at 35,253.
34. Only 22% of industrial employees work in plants in which monitoring is regularly performed;
even in the chemical industry, environmental conditions are regularly monitored in only 21% of the
plants. Id. at 35,255.
35. In most cases continued monitoring is required only if initial monitoring reveals exposure in
excess of the permissible limit. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(d) (1980) (monitoring requirements
for vinyl chloride); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018(e) (monitoring requirements for inorganic arsenic); 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1025(d) (monitoring requirments for lead).
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viding additional information for workers' compensation claims and col-
lective bargaining demands, employers maintaining such records would be
disadvantaged competitively. 6
Another OSHA information initiative has been even less successful.
OSHA proposed a chemical labeling standard on January 16, 1981, 3' but
withdrew it on February 12, 1981 .3 The proposed standard would not
have required comprehensive health risk information, but only general




To fill the gap created by inadequate federal regulation, at least five
states recently have enacted laws aimed at informing employees about oc-
cupational health risks.4  With varying degrees of comprehensiveness, each
law requires employers to discover and to disclose to employees relevant
health risk information. New York's law4 is perhaps the most compre-
hensive. It requires employers to obtain certain information relating to
toxic substances" from the manufacturer and various named government
36. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,212, 35,236 (1980).
37. 46 Fed. Reg. 4412 (1981). The proposed standard was published by OSHA some seven years
after receiving a NIOSH criteria document recommending a standard for identification of occupa-
tional hazards. Id. at 4416.
38. 46 Fed. Reg. 12,020 (1981). Withdrawal of the proposed standard was one of the first acts in
office by President Reagan's Secretary of Labor, Raymond Donovan. See Swift Attack on Regula-
tions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1981, § A, at 15, col. 1 (new Secretary of Labor serves notice he will not
be slow to carry out Reagan's mandate to ease regulatory burden on business).
39. As proposed, the rule would have required manufacturers and importers to identify and eval-
uate hazardous substances according to prescribed procedures. 46 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4442 (1981). Cov-
ered employers would have been required to ensure that containers of hazardous substances were
labeled by common name and Chemical Abstracts Service identification number and were identified
by a prescribed hazard warning label. Id. at 4443.
Hazards would have been separated into two major categories: A for physical hazards and B for
acute or chronic health hazards. Category B contained eight classes of health hazards, each with a
prescribed statement of hazard that would have gone on the label of each substance in the class. For
example, a label on a container holding a carcinogenic substance would have borne the statement,
"Danger: May cause cancer"; a container holding a substance that was toxic on inhalation would
have borne the statement, "Warning, Toxic May be fatal if inhaled"; and a container bearing a
substance judged to be an eye irritant would have borne the statement, "Warning, Irritant: Causes eye
irritation." See id. at 4412, 4452.
40. See 1980 Cal. Stats. 2961 (to be codified in CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6360-99); 1980 Conn. Pub.
Acts, P.A. No. 80-257; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1701 (1980); 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts, P.A. 51;
1980 N.Y. Laws 892 (to be codified in N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875); c. 46 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4422-23
(summary of state statutes and regulations requiring some form of labeling on chemicals in work
place).
41. 1980 N.Y. Laws 892 (to be codified in N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875) (effective January 1981).
42. New York defines a "toxic substance" as any substance that is listed in the latest printed
edition of NIOSH's Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, discussed at note 28 supra, or
that "has yielded positive evidence of acute or chronic health hazards in human, animal or other
biological testing." 1980 N.Y. Laws 892, 892 (to be codified in N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875(2)).
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sources,' 3 to make that information available to employees,"" and to pro-
vide education and training to employees routinely exposed to such sub-
stances." Failure to comply with the New York law exposes the employer
to civil and criminal penalties,"' but neither it nor any of the other state
laws creates a private right of action for affected employees.
Thus, even the more ambitious current statutory approaches fall sub-
stantially short of achieving the policy objectives underlying the em-
ployee's right to know. They do not provide for standardized evaluation
and disclosure of health risks and therefore do not allow comparisons
among different workplaces and job positions. Their effectiveness is lim-
ited by the inadequate and unsystematic information now available to em-
ployers, and by the failure to provide a private right of action for workers.
Moreover, as with any series of state-by-state remedies, these laws cannot
take advantage of economies of scale in the production of health-risk
information.
41
II. A Normative Case for the Right to Know
All employees should have the right to receive information about the
discoverable health risks of their employment. The allocation and distri-
bution of health risks from industrial production can be justified only if
such disclosure is made. Full disclosure is essential to the protection of
individual autonomy in making basic life decisions and to the efficient re-
duction of risks.
A. Legitimating the Distribution of Risk and Respecting Individual
Autonomy
American society endures an uncertain, but large amount of health im-
pairment and increased mortality in order to maintain industrial produc-
tion. 8 Public decisionmaking has concentrated on controlling the magni-
tude of that risk, rather than on distributing the risk equitably. A
disproportionate share of the health costs from the use of industrial toxics
falls upon industrial workers and their families." The statistical risk of
43. Id. at 893.
44. Id.
45. Education and training programs are to be provided prior to initial work assignment and
annually thereafter. Id. at 894.
46. Failure to comply can result in a civil penalty of up to $10,000. Willful violation is a misde-
meanor for which a first offense is punishable by a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment for up to 30
days. Id. at 896.
47. Cf p. 1809 infra (discussion of government's role in producing health risk information).
48. See p. 1792 supra.
49. See pp. 1794-95 supra. In addition to loss of support and companionship, families of indus-
trial workers may face a direct health risk. See Commoner, Workplace Burden, ENVIRONMENT July/
Aug. 1973, at 15, 19 (families exposed to asbestos carried home on the clothes and shoes of workers);
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cancer for workers in certain industries is much greater than that for the
general population." Regulatory standards permit much higher levels of
exposure to toxic substances within the workplace than outside of it."
Case histories reveal strikingly less popular concern and less effective gov-
ernment intervention when hazardous conditions are discovered in the
workplace than when they are found in the general environment.-2
The disproportionate share of health risks borne by industrial workers
would be more equitable and acceptable if the risks were knowingly en-
countered and adequately compensated. 3 Without full knowledge of the
hidden but discoverable health risks that result from exposure to toxic
substances, workers cannot be said to have accepted the risks voluntarily."
Asbestos Researcher Criticizes Lack of Tumor Monitoring, Family Evaluation, [1979] O.S.H. REP.
(BNA) 360 (same).
50. See, e.g., L. AGRAN, THE CANCER CONNECTION 24-25 (1977) (lung cancer accounts for 50%
of all deaths among uranium workers; 94% of dyestuff workers exposed to benzidine and beta-
Napthylamine for five years or more developed bladder tumors); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2,
at 11-38 (statistics showing high rate of cancer in certain industries); Excess Proportion of Cancer
Deaths Among Woodworkers Reported by NIOSH, [1980] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 951 (March 13,
1980); Government Studies Indicate Excesses in Cancers; Industry Challenges Reports, [1980] O.S.H.
REP. (BNA) 573 (elevated risk of brain cancer among petro-chemical workers); UAW Study Finds
Excess Lung Cancer Among Workers at GM Hardware Plant, [1980] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 480.
51. OSHA standards for maximum exposures to airborne pollutants in the workplace generally
exceed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards for the general environment by 10 to 100
times. See W. LOWRANCE, supra note 8, at 90-91; Commoner, supra note 49, at 19.
Comparison of jointly regulated carcinogens reveals similar discrepancies. For example, the permis-
sible workplace exposure level for vinyl chloride is one ppm averaged over an eight hour period with a
ceiling exposure of five ppm averaged over any fifteen minute period. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(c)
(1980). By contrast, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has banned from household use prod-
ucts that contain any vinyl chloride, because they "possess such a degree or nature of hazard that
adequate cautionary labeling cannot be written and the public health and safety can be served only by
keeping such articles out of interstate commerce." 16 C.F.R. § 1500.17(a)(10) (1980). Products con-
taining respirable free-form asbestos also are banned. See 16 C.F.R. § 1500.17(a)(7) (1980) (banning
general use garments containing asbestos). By contrast, OSHA standards permit significant exposure
to asbestos-up to a limit of five fibers longer than five micrometers per cubic cm of air on the average
over eight hours-and set a ceiling exposure limit of ten fibers. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(a) (1980).
52. Workplace evidence of the health hazards of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a widely-used
class of synthetic organic substances, has existed for many years but largely has been ignored; yet
discovery of PCBs in the general environment has led to a great deal of scientific and public concern.
See Commoner, supra note 49, at 17-18. PCBs are now regulated by the EPA under § 307 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 40 C.F.R. § 129.105(b) (1980) (PCBs prohibited in effluent
discharge). There is no workplace standard for PCBs.
The contrast in public response to environmental as opposed to occupational toxic exposures is
demonstrated by the justifiably intense media coverage and political fervor over the dumping of haz-
ardous wastes. See, e.g., The Neighborhood of Fear, TIME, June 2, 1980, at 61 (Love Canal hazard-
ous waste dumpsite in New York); Nuclear Nightmare, TIME, Apr. 9, 1979, at 8 (accident at Three
Mile Island nuclear plant outside of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania). Discoveries that worker populations
have been exposed to the same substances have failed to generate similar responses.
53. Cf W. LOWRANCE, supra note 8, at 87-88 (risks more acceptable when voluntary).
54. It might be argued that with limited worker mobility, especially in times of high unemploy-
ment, the acceptance of workplace risk is not voluntary even if the risk is known. "Poor people, on the
average, will be willing to accept risky work for lower compensation than higher-income individuals
would demand." Nichols & Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Workplace: An Assessment of
OSHA, 49 PUB. INTEREsT, Fall 1977, at 39, 46. This Note does not contend that disclosure of risk is
sufficient to protect workers with limited bargaining power, that OSHA should not continue to set
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The decision to undertake dangerous work in exchange for compensa-
tion is a basic life decision concerning employment, personal health care,
and often the support of one's family. A free society respects individual
autonomy in those three areas of vital personal interest. 5 Only the af-
fected individual can judge whether the compensation offered offsets the
resulting health risk. If the extent of the health risk posed by the work is
hidden from the potential employee, his or her freedom to make this deci-
sion is impaired.
The individual's right to decide whether to undertake dangerous work
should be safeguarded to the same extent as other basic life decisions. As
consumer transactions law has recognized by disclosure laws that protect
the consumer's safety and economic interests,56 choice is not free unless it
is informed. Workers should have the right to know the risks they may
encounter when they accept employment. 7
B. Enhancing the Efficiency of Risk Reduction
Health risks entail serious potential costs for employees and their fami-
lies: medical expenses and lost wages that are not covered by workers'
compensation,"8 and the intangible costs of pain and suffering that may
maximum exposure standards, or that OSHA's lengthy procedures should not be streamlined. In the
case of some organized workers, however, bargaining power may be substantial; if any choice exists,
risks should be disclosed.
55. Our society has long respected an individual's freedom of choice in the conduct of his or her
own affairs. Even before the framing of the Constitution, the common law recognized the importance
of freedom of choice in basic life decisions such as those concerning marriage, procreation, employ-
ment, education, domicile, and personal health care. Cf, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (defining "liberty" for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment in terms of "those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," including
rights to contract, to engage in common occupations of life, to marry, to establish home and bring up
children, to educate oneself); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)
(defining "privileges and immunities" in terms of those "which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments"). See generally I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 61-158 (W. Hastie trans.
1887) (principles of personal rights).
Our courts have protected against infringement the freedom of individuals to make basic life deci-
sions except when the infringement is justified by a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J. concurring) (reviewing Court decisions protecting right to
make basic life decisions and freedom to care for one's health and person); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry person of one's own choosing); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right to privacy in marital relations); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right of
procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to direct education of one's
children).
Civil rights laws protect individual free choice against private sector coercion in employment, travel,
housing, and access to publicly offered accomodations and services. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (access to publicly offered accomodations); § 2000b (access to public facilities); §
2000e (equal employment opportunities).
56. See pp. 1805-06 infra.
57. Cf 'Endangerment' Would Be Felony Offense Under Bill Approved by Senate Panel, [1979]
O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 663 (Senate bill creating federal felony offense for violations of Occupational
Safety and Health Act that place others in danger).
58. Some of the costs of occupational disease are not borne by the employer or the employee but
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accompany illness and premature death. The extra compensation that a
worker may demand for encountering health and safety risks has been
called a "risk premium" or "wage premium", s9
The exaction of risk premiums by employees facing workplace hazards
creates an incentive for employers to reduce health risks and thereby to
reduce wage costs. In a perfectly competitive labor market, with perfect
information and worker mobility, workers' employment decisions would
generate compensation appropriate to the level of risk encountered in the
workplace. If the extra pay demanded by employees for encountering a
risk was greater than the cost of eliminating the risk, the employer would
choose the latter. Thus, by minimizing the sum of the cost of preventing
accidents and illnesses and the cost of risk premiums for hazardous work,
the employer would accept a level of workplace risk identical to that
which the workers would accept if they owned the firm.6o Hazardous con-
ditions would continue only when workers valued more highly the eco-
nomic gain from encountering the hazard than freedom from the risk.
Full disclosure of discoverable health risks would enhance the accuracy
of risk premiums in reflecting the uncompensated costs of occupational
disease and thus would create greater incentive for cost-effective expendi-
tures to reduce health risks.6 1 This would occur to some extent as the
result of aggregate risk premium demand whether or not workers are in a
position to bargain explicitly and collectively about health risks. 2 In the
case of organized workers, assessment of health risks on a workplace-by-
workplace and position-by-position basis would lead to conscious and in-
formed collective bargaining for higher wages, reduction of risks, or
both.63 Thus collective bargaining could become a powerful mechanism for
by the general public as social welfare health benefits. See note 20 supra. These "externalities", costs
of production that escape the price system, see R. HEILBRONER, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 570-71 (3d
ed. 1972), also reduce the employer's incentive to make occupational health expenditures. See Nichols
& Zeckhauser, supra note 54, at 44.
59. Several recent studies have found empirical evidence of risk premiums; such premiums have
long been a part of economists' constructs of labor market behavior. See, e.g., M. BAILEY, REDUCING
RISKS TO LIFE 35-47 (1980) (reviewing several studies and their application to estimating the value of
a life); R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 28-30 (1976); Nichols &
Zeckhauser, supra note 54, at 42-43.
60. Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 54, at 42-43.
61. Studies demonstrating the existence of risk premiums, see note 59 supra, do not measure their
accuracy but only indicate that "workers are at least partially aware of the risks they run, and that, as
economic theory predicts, market forces do lead to higher wages for workers in risky professions."
Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 54, at 43.
62. Studies have found both occupation-specific and industry-wide risk premiums without regard
to whether workers are organized. See R. SMITH, supra note 59, at 30. Because some unions have
been able to acquire information about health risks through the bargaining process, see p. 1795 supra,
it could be expected that awareness of health risks is lower among unorganized workers. Mandated
disclosure by all employers might, therefore, have an even greater impact upon risk premiums in the
case of unorganized workers.
63. It is sometimes suggested that workers inevitably will undervalue health costs expected only in
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regulating occupational health."
III. The Common Law Right to Know
The right of workers to know the hidden health risks of employment
does not depend upon statutory or regulatory innovation. The common
law provides a basis for equitable and injunctive relief to cure the short-
comings of current statutory and regulatory approaches. The employer's
duty to warn and the worker's corresponding right to know are reinforced
by similar rights of bargaining units under the National Labor Relations
Act" and by analogous developments in the field of consumer transactions.
A. The Employer's Common Law Duty
It is well-established under common law that an employer has a gen-
eral duty to provide employees with a reasonably safe place to work," to
identify latent or concealed dangers discoverable in the excercise of rea-
sonable care, 67 and to make such dangers known to the employee.6 This
the statistical future, and that they will inappropriately subordinate concerns about working condi-
dons to concerns about higher wages. There is evidence that such a tendency, if it existed in the past,
is less prevalent today. See D. BERMAN, supra note 3, at 117; S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER
437 (1979) (citing 1970 University of Michigan survey finding that American workers rate health and
safety as a higher priority than increased wages); c. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,212, 35,220 (1980) (testimony
describing how a local union bargained for control of asbestos exposure); UAW Head Announces
Plan to Remove Carcinogens from Automotive Plants, [19801 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1092 (describing
worker initiative to identify and remove workplace health risks); Assistant Labor Secretary Bingham
Speaks of More Coordinated Effort, [1979] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 103 (predicting workers will no
longer trade safety and health for paycheck).
64. [U]nions may be a convenient vehicle for achieving job safety and health objectives. Collec-
tive bargaining agreements produce flexible rules governing work conditions that are tailored
to meet the needs of the individual firm, that reflect the preferences of the parties, that consider
costs of implementation, and that are cost-effective. More important is the fact that the rules
are enforced.
L. BACOW, supra note 22, at 57-58.
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Foreman v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 256 Ala. 253, 54 So. 2d 499 (1951) (employer
liable for failure to provide proper ventilation resulting in lead poisoning); Brown v. Sharphouser
Contracting Co., 159 Cal. 89, 112 P. 874 (1910) (employer liable for failure to prevent earth cave-in);
Nichols v. Harvey Hubbel, Inc., 92 Conn. 611, 103 A. 835 (1918) (employer liable for negligent
design of structure upon which plaintiff was required to work).
67. See, e.g., Rio Grande S. R.R. v. Campbell, 65 Colo. 217, 176 P. 275 (1918) (duty to discover
defects in tools); Ft. Smith & W.R.R. v. Holcombe, 59 Okla. 54, 158 P. 633 (1916) (same); Lemon v.
Lonker, 97 Pa. Super. CL 240 (1929) (duty to warn domestic servant of defective step ladder that was
not obviously defective). But see, e.g., Sample v. Schwenck, 243 Iowa 1189, 54 N.W.2d 527 (1952)
(employer not liable for injury from collapse of granary that reasonably prudent person could not
have anticipated); Purdy v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 197 Pa. 257, 47 A. 237 (1900) (em-
ployer not liable because no reason to know that second-hand barrels used to hold castings were
explosive).
68. See, e.g., Tedford v. Los Angeles Elec. Co., 134 Cal. 76, 66 P. 76 (1901) (employer negligent
in failing to warn of hidden danger in handling wires); Hume v. Fort Halifax Power Co., 106 Me.
78, 75 A. 300 (1909) (employer negligent in failing to warn of risk of construction rock slide); Clay-
ton v. Ainsworth, 122 N.J.L. 160, 4 A.2d 274 (1939) (employer negligent in failing to warn of danger
of falling coal).
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general duty includes the obligation to warn employees of discoverable
dangers of occupational disease. 69 The common law imputes to the em-
ployer not only a knowledge of the constituents and general characteristics
of the substances used in his or her business, but also a scientific under-
standing of their risks. 0
The common law tort most frequently invoked to recover damages for
occupational disease was failure to warn.71 That tort has become much
less important with the advent of strict liability under workers' compensa-
tion laws;72 nonetheless, and especially in light of the highly uncertain and
incomplete compensation for occupational disease, equitable enforcement
of the employer's duty to warn still is needed to legitimate risk distribu-
tion, to respect individual autonomy, and to reduce risk efficiently.
In Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.,7 the court enforced the
similar common law right of an employee to a safe working environ-
ment,74 holding that the Occupational Safety and Health Act did not pre-
69. See, e.g., Galeota v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 123 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S.
813 (1942) (employer under duty to instruct day laborer that inhalation of silica dust might result in
serious harm); Pigeon v. W.P. Fuller & Co., 156 Cal. 691, 105 P. 976 (1909) (employer required to
warn of possible lead poisoning from fume inhalation even if utmost care taken to reduce danger);
Wiseman v. Carter White Lead Co., 100 Neb. 584, 160 N.W. 985 (1916) (employer's duty to warn
of danger of lead poisoning not fully satisfied by providing employee with mask to minimize danger);
Davis v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 116 N.J.L. 103, 182 A. 850 (1936) (employer negligent for failure to
know and warn of danger of manganese poisoning and for failure to take reasonable precautions);
Bohlen, The Common Law Right of Action for Occupational Disease in Pennsylvania, 63 U. PA. L.
REV. 183 (1915) (employer under duty to warn of occupational disease risk when employer's knowl-
edge of risk superior to that employee could reasonably be expected to have). But see McCreery v.
Libby-Owens Ford Glass Co., 363 Il1. 321, 2 N.E.2d 290 (1936) (finding no common law precedent
for duty to furnish healthful place to work and denying worker in glass factory recovery for pneumo-
coniosis and tuberculosis); Ewers v. Buckeye Clay Pot Co., 29 Ohio App. 396, 163 N.E. 577 (1928)
(denying recovery notwithstanding employer's alleged negligence for failure to warn of danger of
"potter's consumption" from dust inhalation).
70. See, e.g., Gentry v. Swann Chem. Co., 234 Ala. 313, 174 So. 530 (1937) (employer obligated
to know and acquaint employee with dangers from working in unventilated room with dust fumes and
chemical particles); Adams v. Grand Rapids Refrigerator Co., 160 Mich. 590, 125 N.W. 724 (1910)
(employer charged with knowledge of chemical changes in enamel manufacture and found negligent
for failure to inform employee of danger of explosion); Harvey v. Welch, 86 N.H. 72, 163 A. 417
(1932) (service station operator liable for employee's poisoning despite ignorance of the effects of
oxalic acid fumes); Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Jamison, 197 Okla. 387, 171 P.2d 976 (1946)
(employer liable for failure to warn inexperienced employee of fatal sulphur dioxide fumes, even
though no previous deaths had resulted from exposure to those fumes).
71. Annot., 105 A.L.R. 80, 96 (1936).
72. Workers' compensation generally has become the injured worker's exclusive remedy against
his or her employer. Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compen-
sation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 1035, 1039. Recently, how-
ever, the California Supreme Court held that a worker disabled by asbestos exposure could sue his
employer outside the workers' compensation system for aggravation of the disease caused by the em-
ployer's fraudulent concealment of the condition and its cause. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra
Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal.3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
73. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976). See 30 U. VAND. L. REV. 1074 (1977) (discussing
Shimp and approving result).
74. The plaintiff, a telephone company secretary allergic to cigarette smoke, successfully sought
an injunction requiring her employer to enact an on-the-job smoking ban.
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empt state legislative or judicial action in the field of occupational safety
and health.75 By distinguishing worker protection from worker compensa-
tion, the Court found that the exclusive damages remedy provided by the
state workers' compensation law did not preclude injunctive relief.76
Because the employer's duty to warn of occupational hazards has a pro-
tective as well as a compensatory purpose,77 equitable relief is similarly
appropriate. Developments in statutory labor law and in the field of con-
sumer transactions subsequent to the development of the common law of
warning have further emphasized the independent protective function of
disclosure apart from any right to damages. These developments also help
define the nature and scope of the common law duty to disclose discovera-
ble occupational hazards in the context of modern, multi-chemical indus-
trial environments.
B. The Right to Know in Labor Law and Consumer Transactions
Statutes are sources of common law and exert an influence on its devel-
opment.7" The Occupational Safety and Health Act79 embodies a recogni-
tion that liability rules are not sufficient to encourage adequate protection
of health and safety in the workplace and emphasizes prevention rather
than compensation." Arbitration hearings and administrative decisions of
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) occasionally have estab-
lished the right of employee representatives to receive information about
health risks under the National Labor Relations Act on the grounds that
the information is required for informed collective bargaining." Under
75. 145 N.J. Super. 522, 368 A.2d 408, 410-11 (Ch. Div. 1976). The court relied on § 4(b)(4) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1976), which states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's
compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or
statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to
injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or-in the course of, employment.
76. 145 N.J. Super. 515, 524, 368 A.2d 408, 412 (Oh. Div. 1976); see Blumrosen, Ackerman,
Kligerman, Van Schaick & Sheehy, Injunctions Against Occupational Hazards: The Right to Work
Under Safe Conditions, 64 CAL. L. REV. 702 (1976) (arguing that private actions by employees under
state law to enjoin unsafe workplace conditions should be maintained under traditional principles of
equity).
77. See Madison v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 88 F.2d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 703 (1937) (object of warning is to allow for prevention); see Robinette v. Norfolk & W.Ry. Co.,
249 Ky. 93, 60 S.W.2d 344 (1933) (same).
78. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401 (1968).
Statutes were recognized as sources of common law in the nineteenth-century doctrine of the equity of
statutes. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 214-15 (R.
Pound ed. 1934).
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
80. The Occupational Safety and Health Act was enacted "to reduce the number and severity of
work-related injuries and illnesses which, despite current efforts of employers and government, are
resulting in ever-increasing human misery and economic loss." S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
1, reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5177.
81. In 1973, for example, the Ciba-Geigy company in McIntosh, Alabama was required by an
1805
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 1792, 1981
these decisions unions have been supplied with the generic names of all
chemical substances used or produced in the employer's plant, toxicity and
health effect information, monitoring data, and statistical data related to
working conditions.8 2
A right to know analogous to that of the employee at common law has
developed in the field of consumer transactions, first through the common
law, in the tort of misrepresentation and the contract doctrine of implied
warranty, and later through direct disclosure regulation.8" Federal legisla-
tion now requires standardized disclosure of material facts in major areas
of consumer transactions. The Hazardous Substances Labeling Act,84 for
example, requires the identification of toxic substances. Similar laws man-
date the disclosure of standardized finance charge rates and other credit
information in consumer credit sales and loan transactions,"5 warnings
that cigarette smoking is hazardous to health,86 specifications of fabric
composition, 7 and listings of the ingredients in certain packaged foods."8
The consumer's right to know has developed partly in response to the
information imperfections and hidden hazards created by complex produc-
tion and marketing processes. 9 Information-search costs by consumers are
duplicative and prohibitively high and make standardized disclosure by
sellers the most efficient solution to information market imperfections.
By requiring more information rather than controlling products, disclo-
sure laws affirm the right of individuals to free choice of personal utility.
Similar information imperfections exist in the workplace, which has
arbitration decision to furnish to Local 3-562 of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union
(OCAW) the chemical names of the hundreds of substances used in the plant, most of which had been
known only by trade names or code numbers. D. BERMAN, supra note 3, at 191. In October 1977, in
response to the discovery of sterility among OCAW pesticide workers exposed to dibromo
chloropropane (DBCP), the OCAW directed its local unions to request from their employers detailed
information about toxic exposures and morbidity statistics. NLRB decisions in Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. & OCAW Local 6-418, N.L.R.B. JD-124-79 (Minneapolis, March 13, 1979) and in Col-
gate Palmolive Co. & OCAW Local 5-114, N.L.R.B. JD-(SF)-61-79 (Kansas City, March 27, 1979)
upheld such requests under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1),
158(a)(5) (1976), as relevant and necessary to the unions' obligations to represent fairly and properly
the employees in the bargaining unit. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. & OCAW Local 6-418,
N.L.R.B. JD-124-79 (Minneapolis, March 13, 1979), at 6.
82. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. & OCAW Local 6-418, N.L.R.B. JD-124-79 (Minneapolis,
March 13, 1979), at 18.
83. SEE D. RICE, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 330 (1975). The philosophy of caveat emptor that
developed in the nineeteenth century, see id. at 4, has increasingly given way to the philosophy of "let
the seller disclose." Mourning v. Family Publications Serv. Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1274 (1976).
85. Consumer Credit Protection Act (Truth in Lending Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-40 (1976).
86. Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. § 1331-1340 (1976).
87. Labeling of Fur Products, 15 U.S.C. § 69 (1976); Textile Fiber Products Identification, 15
U.S.C. § 70 (1976); Labeling of Wool Products, 21 U.S.C. § 68(b) (1976).
88. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 15 U.S.C. § 343 (1976).
89. See D. RICE, supra note 83, at 5.
90. Id. at 331.
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been transformed by a related increase in complexity and in the use of
products with hidden dangers. In fact, disabled workers have sought com-
pensation through product liability claims from manufacturers of work-
place equipment, materials, or substances to supplement inadequate work-
ers' compensation .91 Employers, like sellers of.hazardous products, have
lower information costs than employees in assessing the risks specific to
their workplaces, and through disclosure can enhance the ability of em-
ployees to contract for maximum personal utility.
On this common law basis, supported by analogy to consumer transac-
tions law, employers should have the duty to disclose to employees all
reasonably discoverable information regarding the identity and associated
health risks of all toxic substances found in their workplaces. Courts
should issue injunctions requiring disclosure on a job position basis to any
aggrieved employee or class of employees.
IV. Federal Right to Know Legislation
Though the common law establishes an equitable basis for disclosure of
health risks, neither it nor current state statutory approaches92 can facili-
tate the standardization necessary for competitive efficiency in risk reduc-
tion. Only federal legislation, coupled with increased federal expenditures
on research, can achieve this standardization and further the objectives
underlying the right to know.
Federal disclosure legislation based on the consumer protection model
should require employers to obtain the best available information about
the risks associated with substances to which employees are exposed and
to disclose that information in a systematic way. The information should
include the generic names of all chemicals used in the workplace, 93 to al-
91. See Note, supra note 3, at 919-20. Some courts have imposed on manufacturers a duty to
warn users and consumers, including those who use the manufacturer's products on the job. This
manufacturer's duty is similar to the employer's common law duty to warn the employee. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments j & k (1965).
In Borel v. Fibreboard Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), the court applied strict prod-
ucts liability doctrine to a case involving occupational disease. The plaintiff had been an insulation
worker and had contracted asbestosis, a chronic lung disease resulting from inhalation of asbestos
fibers. Finding the manufacturer liable for failure to warn, the court interpreted the seller's duty as "a
responsibility to inform users and consumers of dangers which the seller either knows or should know
at the time the product is sold," limited by what is "reasonably foreseeable, or scientifically discovera-
ble." Id. at 1088. The insulation manufacturer was held to the "knowledge and skill of an expert,"
including "at a minimum [that] he must keep abreast of scientific knowledge, discoveries, and ad-
vances and is presumed to know what is imparted thereby." Id. at 1089.
92. Current state statutes do not require standardized disclosure of the kind proposed here. See
pp. 1798-99 supra. Economies of scale in the production of toxicological information make standardi-
zation through federal action much more feasible. See pp. 1808 infra.
93. The principal objection raised by employers to disclosure of the chemical identity of sub-
stances, the need to protect trade secrets, is valid only in limited circumstances. See Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co. & OCAW Local 6-418, N.L.R.B. JD-124-79 (Minneapolis, March 13, 1979), at 13
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low independent assessment by employees and their representatives of
substances whose toxicity is uncertain. 4 Employers also should be re-
quired to describe any established health risks presented by each chemical
at various exposure levels and to estimate the exposure levels in the work-
place for each work position.9"
Rather than requiring evaluation by individual employers, the act
should require the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH)96 to assess the health risks posed by all toxic substances at vari-
ous exposure levels and to maintain the standardized evaluations on a cur-
rent basis. 7 NIOSH should classify substances by the nature of the risk
they pose,98 and should construct a dose response curve" or other risk
quantification for each hazardous substance. 100
The required occupational health risk disclosures should be presented
in an "occupational health impact statement." Every employer should be
required to prepare the statement annually for distribution to all current
and potential employees. By providing standardized information, occupa-
tional health impact statements would enable employees to compare the
health risks posed by alternative workplaces and work positions. The
statement's format also could be standardized to facilitate such
comparison.
Private parties should be able to enforce right to know legislation by
recovering substantial, fixed civil penalties for violations, without having
(trade secrets do not excuse employer from obligation to provide information relevant to Union's duty
to bargain on behalf of employees); 45 Fed. Reg. 35,212, 35,217 (1980) (trade secret concerns ac-
comodated only when not in conflict with purposes of disclosure).
94. The right to independent assessment is particularly important in the case of substances whose
chemical structure has been altered slightly or recently.
95. This requirement need not result in added monitoring expenses for employers. NIOSH could
provide tables of exposure estimates for standard industrial processes based on sample monitoring for
use by employers who are not required to monitor and who choose not to do so. The employer who
feels such estimates are too high would be free to undertake monitoring.
96. See note 10 supra.
97. NIOSH currently maintains The Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, see note
28 supra, which catalogs toxic substances and the level at which toxicity occurs.
98. For example, all substances for which a positive Ames test has been conducted but for which
there is no other toxicological and no epidemiological evidence of carcinogenity might fall within one
classification. The Ames test, developed by Professor Ames of the University of California at Berkeley,
provides a quick indication of potential carcinogenity. L. AGRAN, supra note 50, at 64. OSHA's classi-
fication scheme for carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1990)
(classifying carcinogens into four categories), represents the kind of classificatory framework that
could be used to establish standardized risk assessment.
99. Toxicological testing of substances given to animals in high dosages may establish a curve that
indicates probable toxicity or carcinogenity at the lower dosage levels to which workers may be ex-
posed. Epidemiological studies with complete data bases also could establish a relationship between
statistical occurrence of disease (response) and levels of exposure (dose).
100. The average worker should be able to interpret quantitative risk assessment adequately. See




to prove actual damages. t"' Any employee or job offeree who does not
receive an occupational health impact statement or who receives a false or
incomplete statement should have a cause of action. Private enforcement is
consistent with viewing disclosure as an individual, common law right,
and would ensure effective disclosure without a massive expansion of fed-
eral inspection and prosecution resources.
The government should increase its role in the collection of toxicological
and epidemiological information to take advantage of economies of scale in
research on occupational health risks. The ultimate effectiveness of disclo-
sure legislation will depend in large part upon the resources allocated to
research and the quality of the resulting risk assessments. The current
allocation of resources for occupational health research in general and for
toxicological research in particular is much too small, especially in com-
parison with overall expenditures on cancer research.
1 2
The proposed legislation would create d meaningful right to know in
the context of occupational disease, and would make more just the distri-
bution of health risks resulting from the use of industrial chemicals. Occu-
pational health impact statements would permit more effective bargaining
for safer workplaces and more accurate risk premiums. Such statements
also would create a very complete data base for epidemiological studies.
Finally, the imposition of civil liability would force employers to bear
more fully the health costs of their enterprises and thus would encourage
cost-effective alteration of production processes to reduce health risks.
Conclusion
By most accounts, current efforts to regulate occupational health and
safety are ineffectual.10° A major obstacle to effective reduction of work-
place health risks is the lack of information provided to those at risk. Cur-
101. A similar liability structure, including the award of reasonable attorneys' fees in successful
actions, has been utilized in other federal disclosure legislation. See, e.g., § 130 of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976). Enforcement depends largely on "private attorney generals." See
Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Macey, Award of
Attorney Fees as a Stimulant to Private Litigation Under the Truth in Lending Act, 27 BUS. LAW.
593 (1973). This enforcement mechanism also has been utilized in civil rights legislation. See, e.g.,
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976) (reasonable attor-
neys' fees to prevailing party in discretion of court).
102. Epidemiological studies indicate that environmental factors cause from 70% to 90% of all
cancers. See S. EPSTEIN, supra note 63, at 19. Yet only 6% of National Cancer Institute expenditures
are devoted to chemical carcinogenesis, allowing for screening of about 50 of the 500 to 1,000 new
substances that are developed each year. Job Diseases Unpublicized Threat, Obey Says in Accepting
Steiger Award, [19791 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 609 (statement of Rep. David R. Obey (D-Wis.) at Amer-
ican Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists mid-year symposium). See generally S. EP-
STEIN, supra note 63, at 330-34 (analysis of National Cancer Institute budget priorities).
103. See, e.g., D. BERMAN, supra note 3, at 33-36 ("Five years of OSHA have led to few im-
provements in working conditions."); Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 54, at 39 (OSHA's perform-
ance "has become a prominent symbol of misguided Federal regulation").
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rent statutory and regulatory approaches have not dealt adequately with
this information problem. Equitable enforcement of the employer's com-
mon law duty to warn employees will help to remedy this inadequacy, but
legislation requiring standardized disclosure is needed to support fully the
right of workers to protect their own health. Great potential remains for
effective self-regulation by an informed workplace population." 4 As
OSHA has recognized, "[s]ound public policy dictates that workers be af-
forded a central role in the detection and solution of health problems, as
there are no assurances that anyone else will protect their health with
equal vigor or determination."' 15
104. See Marshall Details Labor Department Plan to Evaluate Labor-Management Committees,
[1980] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 3 (discussing Labor Department evaluation of possible incorporation of
labor-management committees into its occupational health and safety strategy); Safety/Health Corn-
mittees, Bargaining Seen as Growing Factors in Regulation, [1980] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 597 (Morris
Davis, executive director of labor occupational health program, University of California at Berkeley,
arguing that labor-management committees and bargaining are growing forces in workplace
regulation).
105. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,212, 35,213 (1980).
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